From e77f605c9cd4f8f0ae8e6985dfb0aaae1e6f6d6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JP Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2026 05:33:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Add OAuth 2.1 server so claude.ai and ChatGPT can connect natively Phase A needed a token pasted into a header, which Anthropic documents as an org-admin-scoped beta on claude.ai and is undocumented on ChatGPT. This makes the app its own authorization server so both connect through their normal "add a connector" flow, with a per-user consent screen. The whole thing funnels into the existing verifyMcpToken: an issued access token is an ordinary McpAccessToken row with source "oauth", so the resource server gained no OAuth awareness and Phase A's verification path is unchanged. Notes on the parts that fail quietly if got wrong: - scopes_supported is published in the protected resource metadata. When a 401 challenge carries no explicit scope Claude requests exactly what is advertised there, so omitting it silently makes every connection read-only. - Loopback redirect URIs match with the port ignored. Claude Code registers http://localhost/callback and then redirects to an ephemeral port; exact matching would reject every native client. RFC 8252 7.3 requires this. - CIMD is deliberately not advertised. Claude only selects it when the metadata carries client_id_metadata_document_supported, and supporting it would mean fetching a client-supplied URL server-side from a host that also reaches MinIO, Postgres and the gateway on the LAN. DCR costs nothing by comparison. - The consent page validates client_id and redirect_uri before it will redirect anywhere, because an unvalidated redirect_uri is an open redirect. - Authorization codes are consumed by one guarded updateMany, so a replay under concurrency cannot mint a second token. A PKCE mismatch burns the whole grant rather than just the code. - Refresh tokens rotate and keep the previous hash; presenting it revokes the grant, since that is either theft or a client that cannot be trusted to hold state. Also fixes the login page, which hardcoded callbackUrl and so dropped anyone sent to sign in for the consent screen onto /dashboard instead. Same-origin destinations only, absolute or relative - the middleware writes absolute. "/.well-known" joins PUBLIC_ROUTES. It is a prefix match, so nothing else should be served from there. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1Ee4Mc1X1SX8HgYa52zu7 --- src/app/(auth)/login/page.tsx | 47 ++- .../oauth-authorization-server/route.ts | 65 +++++ .../oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp/route.ts | 15 + .../oauth-protected-resource/route.ts | 62 ++++ src/app/api/oauth/authorize/route.ts | 102 +++++++ src/app/api/oauth/register/route.ts | 142 +++++++++ src/app/api/oauth/revoke/route.ts | 56 ++++ src/app/api/oauth/token/route.ts | 199 +++++++++++++ src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/[id]/route.ts | 27 ++ src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/route.ts | 32 ++ src/app/oauth/authorize/page.tsx | 183 ++++++++++++ src/components/oauth/consent-form.tsx | 71 +++++ src/components/settings/mcp-tokens-card.tsx | 80 +++++ src/lib/auth.ts | 11 + src/lib/mcp/authorize-request.ts | 139 +++++++++ src/lib/mcp/oauth.ts | 276 ++++++++++++++++++ 16 files changed, 1505 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/app/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/api/oauth/authorize/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/api/oauth/register/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/api/oauth/revoke/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/api/oauth/token/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/[id]/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/route.ts create mode 100644 src/app/oauth/authorize/page.tsx create mode 100644 src/components/oauth/consent-form.tsx create mode 100644 src/lib/mcp/authorize-request.ts create mode 100644 src/lib/mcp/oauth.ts diff --git a/src/app/(auth)/login/page.tsx b/src/app/(auth)/login/page.tsx index 088933a..20813ec 100644 --- a/src/app/(auth)/login/page.tsx +++ b/src/app/(auth)/login/page.tsx @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ "use client" -import { useState } from "react" +import { Suspense, useState } from "react" import { signIn } from "next-auth/react" +import { useSearchParams } from "next/navigation" import Link from "next/link" import { Beer, Loader2 } from "lucide-react" import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button" @@ -9,7 +10,49 @@ import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input" import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label" import { Card, CardContent, CardDescription, CardHeader, CardTitle } from "@/components/ui/card" +/** + * Only same-origin destinations are honoured. Without this check the + * `?callbackUrl=` parameter - which anyone can put in a link - would make the + * login page an open redirect onto an attacker's site, wearing our domain. + * + * Both forms have to be accepted. A relative path is what /oauth/authorize + * builds, while the middleware's own redirect writes an absolute URL, and + * rejecting that one would quietly drop people on /dashboard instead of the + * consent screen they were sent to sign in for. + * + * A leading `//` is rejected because `//evil.com` is protocol-relative, which + * the browser resolves as absolute. + */ +function safeCallbackUrl(value: string | null): string { + if (!value) return "/dashboard" + + if (value.startsWith("/")) { + return value.startsWith("//") ? "/dashboard" : value + } + + try { + const target = new URL(value) + if (target.origin === window.location.origin) { + return `${target.pathname}${target.search}${target.hash}` + } + } catch { + // Not a URL at all. + } + return "/dashboard" +} + export default function LoginPage() { + // useSearchParams needs a Suspense boundary; this page prerenders statically. + return ( + + + + ) +} + +function LoginForm() { + const searchParams = useSearchParams() + const callbackUrl = safeCallbackUrl(searchParams.get("callbackUrl")) const [email, setEmail] = useState("") const [password, setPassword] = useState("") const [error, setError] = useState("") @@ -24,7 +67,7 @@ export default function LoginPage() { const result = await signIn("credentials", { email, password, - callbackUrl: "/dashboard", + callbackUrl, redirect: false, }) diff --git a/src/app/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/route.ts b/src/app/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2574ef1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { mcpBaseUrl } from "@/lib/mcp/config" +import { SUPPORTED_SCOPES } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * RFC 8414 authorization server metadata. + * + * `issuer` must equal the base URL this document was discovered at, so it is + * derived from the same NEXTAUTH_URL everything else uses rather than hardcoded. + */ +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +function metadata() { + const base = mcpBaseUrl() + return { + issuer: base, + authorization_endpoint: `${base}/oauth/authorize`, + token_endpoint: `${base}/api/oauth/token`, + registration_endpoint: `${base}/api/oauth/register`, + revocation_endpoint: `${base}/api/oauth/revoke`, + response_types_supported: ["code"], + grant_types_supported: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + // Claude always sends a PKCE challenge and checks that S256 is advertised + // before starting the flow. `plain` is not accepted. + code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"], + // Public clients only. No client secret is ever issued or stored, so there + // is none to leak from this deployment. + token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["none"], + revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["none"], + scopes_supported: SUPPORTED_SCOPES, + service_documentation: `${base}/settings`, + // + // Deliberately absent: client_id_metadata_document_supported. + // + // Claude picks CIMD only when this document advertises BOTH that flag and + // "none" in token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported; omitting it makes both + // Claude and ChatGPT fall back to dynamic registration cleanly. CIMD would + // mean fetching a client-supplied URL server-side, from a host that also + // reaches MinIO on 127.0.0.1:9000, Postgres on 5432 and the Switchboard + // gateway on the LAN. That is an SSRF pivot in exchange for nothing here; + // registration is a POST to our own endpoint with no outbound traffic. + } +} + +const CORS = { + "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", + "Cache-Control": "public, max-age=3600", +} + +export function GET(): NextResponse { + return NextResponse.json(metadata(), { headers: CORS }) +} + +export function OPTIONS(): Response { + return new Response(null, { + status: 204, + headers: { + "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", + "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, OPTIONS", + "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "Authorization, Content-Type", + "Access-Control-Max-Age": "86400", + }, + }) +} diff --git a/src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp/route.ts b/src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..599e8a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/** + * RFC 9728 path-inserted form of the protected resource metadata. + * + * For a resource at https://host/api/mcp, a client probes + * /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp before falling back to the bare + * /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource. Both are served so discovery works + * whichever a given client tries, and whether or not it read the + * WWW-Authenticate challenge that names the URL explicitly. + */ +export { GET, OPTIONS } from "../../route" + +// Declared literally rather than re-exported: Next reads these statically and +// cannot follow a re-export. +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" diff --git a/src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route.ts b/src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..981fe21 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { generateProtectedResourceMetadata } from "mcp-handler" +import { mcpBaseUrl, mcpResourceUrl } from "@/lib/mcp/config" +import { SUPPORTED_SCOPES } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * RFC 9728 protected resource metadata - how a client discovers where to + * authenticate for /api/mcp. + * + * Two constraints worth stating, because breaking either fails silently as + * "couldn't reach the MCP server": + * + * - `resource` must match the URL the user typed into their client exactly, + * which is why both it and the issuer come from NEXTAUTH_URL rather than the + * request. See src/lib/mcp/config.ts. + * - Claude reads only the FIRST entry of authorization_servers and does not + * fall back to later ones, so there is exactly one. + * + * This path sits outside /api, so it is caught by the middleware matcher and + * needs "/.well-known" in PUBLIC_ROUTES - otherwise it answers with an HTML + * redirect to /login and discovery never starts. + */ +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +/** + * `scopes_supported` is not decoration. When a client's 401 challenge carries no + * explicit scope, Claude requests exactly the scopes advertised here - so + * omitting it makes every connection fall back to the read-only default and the + * user is left wondering why the assistant cannot add a drink. The consent + * screen is what actually gates the write scopes. + */ +export function GET(): Response { + const metadata = generateProtectedResourceMetadata({ + authServerUrls: [mcpBaseUrl()], + resourceUrl: mcpResourceUrl(), + additionalMetadata: { + scopes_supported: SUPPORTED_SCOPES, + resource_name: "DrinkTracker", + bearer_methods_supported: ["header"], + }, + }) + + return NextResponse.json(metadata, { + headers: { + "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", + "Cache-Control": "public, max-age=3600", + }, + }) +} + +export function OPTIONS(): Response { + return new Response(null, { + status: 204, + headers: { + "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", + "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, OPTIONS", + "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "Authorization, Content-Type", + "Access-Control-Max-Age": "86400", + }, + }) +} diff --git a/src/app/api/oauth/authorize/route.ts b/src/app/api/oauth/authorize/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0246c21 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/api/oauth/authorize/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { z } from "zod" +import { requireUser } from "@/lib/authz" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { + buildRedirect, + validateAuthorizeRequest, +} from "@/lib/mcp/authorize-request" +import { AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS, generateAuthCode } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * The user's decision on the consent screen. + * + * Everything is re-validated from the query string rather than trusted from the + * request body: the body is just a carrier for the original parameters, and + * treating any of it as already-checked would let a crafted POST mint a code for + * a client and redirect the page never approved. + */ +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +const bodySchema = z.object({ + decision: z.enum(["allow", "deny"]), + search: z.string().max(4096), +}) + +export async function POST(request: Request) { + const session = await requireUser() + if (session instanceof NextResponse) return session + + const parsed = bodySchema.safeParse(await request.json().catch(() => null)) + if (!parsed.success) { + return NextResponse.json({ error: "invalid_request" }, { status: 400 }) + } + + const search = new URLSearchParams(parsed.data.search) + const validation = await validateAuthorizeRequest(search) + + if (validation.kind === "fatal") { + return NextResponse.json( + { error: "invalid_request", error_description: validation.message }, + { status: 400 } + ) + } + if (validation.kind === "redirectable") { + return NextResponse.json({ + redirectTo: buildRedirect(validation.redirectUri, { + error: validation.error, + error_description: validation.description, + state: validation.state, + }), + }) + } + + const { params, client } = validation + const userId = session.user.id + + if (parsed.data.decision === "deny") { + return NextResponse.json({ + redirectTo: buildRedirect(params.redirectUri, { + error: "access_denied", + error_description: "The user declined the request.", + state: params.state, + }), + }) + } + + // One standing grant per (client, user). Re-approving widens the scopes and + // clears a previous revocation rather than piling up rows. + const grant = await prisma.oAuthGrant.upsert({ + where: { clientId_userId: { clientId: client.id, userId } }, + update: { scopes: params.scopes, revokedAt: null }, + create: { clientId: client.id, userId, scopes: params.scopes }, + select: { id: true }, + }) + + const { code, hash } = generateAuthCode() + await prisma.oAuthAuthCode.create({ + data: { + codeHash: hash, + clientId: client.id, + userId, + redirectUri: params.redirectUri, + resource: params.resource, + scopes: params.scopes, + codeChallenge: params.codeChallenge, + codeChallengeMethod: "S256", + expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS), + }, + }) + + console.log( + `[oauth] granted user=${userId} client=${client.clientId} scopes=${params.scopes.join(",")} grant=${grant.id}` + ) + + return NextResponse.json({ + redirectTo: buildRedirect(params.redirectUri, { + code, + state: params.state, + }), + }) +} diff --git a/src/app/api/oauth/register/route.ts b/src/app/api/oauth/register/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..462c133 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/api/oauth/register/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { z } from "zod" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { rateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit" +import { + generateClientId, + isRegisterableRedirectUri, + oauthError, +} from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. + * + * Unauthenticated by specification, which makes it the one endpoint on this + * deployment that a stranger can create rows through. Hence the rate limit, the + * global cap, and the pruning of registrations that never went on to be used. + */ +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +/** Beyond this many registrations in a day, something is wrong. */ +const DAILY_REGISTRATION_CAP = 500 +const PRUNE_AFTER_MS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 + +const registerSchema = z.object({ + client_name: z.string().min(1).max(200).optional(), + redirect_uris: z.array(z.string().min(1)).min(1).max(10), + grant_types: z.array(z.string()).optional(), + response_types: z.array(z.string()).optional(), + token_endpoint_auth_method: z.string().optional(), + scope: z.string().max(500).optional(), + client_uri: z.string().max(2048).optional(), + logo_uri: z.string().max(2048).optional(), + software_id: z.string().max(200).optional(), +}) + +export async function POST(request: Request) { + const forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for") + const hops = forwarded?.split(",").map((h) => h.trim()).filter(Boolean) ?? [] + // Last hop, not first: everything before it is client-supplied and can be + // forged for a fresh bucket. Same reasoning as the register route. + const ip = hops.length > 0 ? hops[hops.length - 1] : "unknown" + + const rl = rateLimit(`dcr:${ip}`, 5, 60 * 60 * 1000) + if (!rl.success) { + return oauthError( + "temporarily_unavailable", + "Too many registration attempts.", + 429 + ) + } + + const body = await request.json().catch(() => null) + if (!body) return oauthError("invalid_client_metadata", "Body must be JSON.") + + const parsed = registerSchema.safeParse(body) + if (!parsed.success) { + return oauthError("invalid_client_metadata", parsed.error.issues[0]?.message) + } + const data = parsed.data + + // Public clients only. Accepting a confidential client would mean storing a + // secret this server has no need for and no way to protect better than the + // PKCE it already requires. + const authMethod = data.token_endpoint_auth_method ?? "none" + if (authMethod !== "none") { + return oauthError( + "invalid_client_metadata", + "This server issues public clients only; token_endpoint_auth_method must be \"none\"." + ) + } + + const bad = data.redirect_uris.filter((u) => !isRegisterableRedirectUri(u)) + if (bad.length) { + return oauthError( + "invalid_redirect_uri", + `Redirect URIs must be https or a loopback address, with no fragment: ${bad.join(", ")}` + ) + } + + const since = new Date(Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) + const recent = await prisma.oAuthClient.count({ + where: { createdAt: { gte: since } }, + }) + if (recent >= DAILY_REGISTRATION_CAP) { + return oauthError( + "temporarily_unavailable", + "Registration is temporarily closed.", + 503 + ) + } + + const clientId = generateClientId() + const client = await prisma.oAuthClient.create({ + data: { + clientId, + clientName: data.client_name ?? "Unnamed client", + redirectUris: data.redirect_uris, + grantTypes: data.grant_types ?? ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + responseTypes: data.response_types ?? ["code"], + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "none", + scope: data.scope ?? null, + clientUri: data.client_uri ?? null, + logoUri: data.logo_uri ?? null, + softwareId: data.software_id ?? null, + }, + }) + + pruneUnusedClients() + + return NextResponse.json( + { + client_id: client.clientId, + client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(client.createdAt.getTime() / 1000), + client_name: client.clientName, + redirect_uris: client.redirectUris, + grant_types: client.grantTypes, + response_types: client.responseTypes, + token_endpoint_auth_method: "none", + ...(client.scope ? { scope: client.scope } : {}), + }, + { status: 201, headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-store" } } + ) +} + +/** + * Registrations that never led to a grant are abandoned handshakes. Cleared + * opportunistically rather than on a schedule, because there is no scheduler. + */ +function pruneUnusedClients(): void { + prisma.oAuthClient + .deleteMany({ + where: { + createdAt: { lt: new Date(Date.now() - PRUNE_AFTER_MS) }, + grants: { none: {} }, + }, + }) + .then(({ count }) => { + if (count > 0) console.log(`[oauth] pruned ${count} unused client(s)`) + }) + .catch((error) => console.warn("[oauth] client prune failed:", error)) +} diff --git a/src/app/api/oauth/revoke/route.ts b/src/app/api/oauth/revoke/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7a6a72 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/api/oauth/revoke/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { revokeGrant, sha256 } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * RFC 7009 token revocation. + * + * Always answers 200, even for a token that does not exist. That is the spec's + * requirement and it is also what stops this endpoint from becoming an oracle + * for guessing valid tokens. + */ +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +export async function POST(request: Request) { + const contentType = request.headers.get("content-type") ?? "" + const form = contentType.includes("application/json") + ? new URLSearchParams( + Object.entries((await request.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record) + .map(([k, v]) => [k, String(v)]) + ) + : new URLSearchParams(await request.text()) + + const token = form.get("token") + const ok = NextResponse.json({}, { headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-store" } }) + if (!token) return ok + + const hash = sha256(token) + + try { + // A refresh token identifies the whole grant, so revoking it ends the + // connection outright. + const grant = await prisma.oAuthGrant.findFirst({ + where: { OR: [{ refreshHash: hash }, { refreshPrevHash: hash }] }, + select: { id: true }, + }) + if (grant) { + await revokeGrant(grant.id) + return ok + } + + // An access token revokes only itself; the client can still refresh. That + // matches RFC 7009's guidance that revoking an access token need not + // invalidate the refresh token. + await prisma.mcpAccessToken.updateMany({ + where: { tokenHash: hash, revokedAt: null }, + data: { revokedAt: new Date() }, + }) + } catch (error) { + // Still a 200 - the caller's intent was for the token to stop working, and + // reporting an internal failure here tells them nothing useful. + console.error("[oauth] revoke failed:", error) + } + + return ok +} diff --git a/src/app/api/oauth/token/route.ts b/src/app/api/oauth/token/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9da3db --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/api/oauth/token/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { + OFFLINE_ACCESS, + generateRefreshToken, + issueAccessToken, + oauthError, + redirectUriMatches, + revokeGrant, + sha256, + storeRefreshToken, + verifyPkce, +} from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * RFC 6749 token endpoint. + * + * Bodies arrive as application/x-www-form-urlencoded - required by the spec and + * what Claude sends for both the initial exchange and every refresh. JSON is + * accepted as well, since some clients send it and there is no reason to be + * strict about it. + */ +export const runtime = "nodejs" +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +const NO_STORE = { "Cache-Control": "no-store", Pragma: "no-cache" } + +async function readForm(request: Request): Promise { + const contentType = request.headers.get("content-type") ?? "" + if (contentType.includes("application/json")) { + const body = await request.json().catch(() => ({})) + return new URLSearchParams( + Object.entries(body as Record).map(([k, v]) => [k, String(v)]) + ) + } + return new URLSearchParams(await request.text()) +} + +export async function POST(request: Request) { + const form = await readForm(request) + const grantType = form.get("grant_type") + + if (grantType === "authorization_code") return exchangeCode(form) + if (grantType === "refresh_token") return refresh(form) + + return oauthError( + "unsupported_grant_type", + "Supported grant types are authorization_code and refresh_token." + ) +} + +async function exchangeCode(form: URLSearchParams) { + const code = form.get("code") + const clientId = form.get("client_id") + const redirectUri = form.get("redirect_uri") + const verifier = form.get("code_verifier") + + if (!code || !clientId || !redirectUri || !verifier) { + return oauthError( + "invalid_request", + "code, client_id, redirect_uri and code_verifier are all required." + ) + } + + const row = await prisma.oAuthAuthCode.findUnique({ + where: { codeHash: sha256(code) }, + include: { + client: { select: { id: true, clientId: true, clientName: true } }, + user: { select: { id: true, status: true } }, + }, + }) + if (!row) return oauthError("invalid_grant", "Unknown or expired code.") + + // Consume before verifying anything else. One guarded statement, one row + // lock: whoever wins gets count 1 and everyone else gets 0, so a replayed + // code cannot mint a second token even under concurrency. A code that fails + // verification below stays consumed, which is the intent - it has been seen. + const { count } = await prisma.oAuthAuthCode.updateMany({ + where: { + codeHash: row.codeHash, + consumedAt: null, + expiresAt: { gt: new Date() }, + }, + data: { consumedAt: new Date() }, + }) + if (count !== 1) { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This code has already been used or has expired.") + } + + if (row.client.clientId !== clientId) { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This code was issued to a different client.") + } + // Exact match against what was recorded at authorize time, not a fresh + // registration lookup - the pairing is what is being verified. + if (!redirectUriMatches(row.redirectUri, redirectUri)) { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "redirect_uri does not match the authorization request.") + } + + const grant = await prisma.oAuthGrant.findUnique({ + where: { clientId_userId: { clientId: row.client.id, userId: row.userId } }, + select: { id: true, revokedAt: true }, + }) + if (!grant || grant.revokedAt) { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This authorization is no longer valid.") + } + + if (!verifyPkce(verifier, row.codeChallenge)) { + // A verifier that does not match means whoever is holding this code is + // probably not who the code was issued to. Burn the whole grant, not just + // the code. + await revokeGrant(grant.id) + console.warn( + `[oauth] PKCE mismatch for client=${row.client.clientId} user=${row.userId}; grant revoked` + ) + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "PKCE verification failed.") + } + + if (row.user.status !== "ACTIVE") { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This account is not active.") + } + + const tokens = await issueAccessToken( + grant.id, + row.userId, + row.scopes, + row.client.clientName + ) + + // A refresh token only exists if offline_access was actually granted. + let refreshToken: string | undefined + if (row.scopes.includes(OFFLINE_ACCESS)) { + const minted = generateRefreshToken() + await storeRefreshToken(grant.id, minted.hash, null) + refreshToken = minted.token + } + + console.log( + `[oauth] token issued user=${row.userId} client=${row.client.clientId} grant=${grant.id}` + ) + return NextResponse.json( + { ...tokens, ...(refreshToken ? { refresh_token: refreshToken } : {}) }, + { headers: NO_STORE } + ) +} + +async function refresh(form: URLSearchParams) { + const token = form.get("refresh_token") + if (!token) return oauthError("invalid_request", "refresh_token is required.") + + const hash = sha256(token) + + const grant = await prisma.oAuthGrant.findFirst({ + where: { OR: [{ refreshHash: hash }, { refreshPrevHash: hash }] }, + include: { + client: { select: { clientId: true, clientName: true } }, + user: { select: { status: true } }, + }, + }) + if (!grant) return oauthError("invalid_grant", "Unknown refresh token.") + + // Presenting the previous generation means the current one was rotated out + // from under this caller - either a replay of a stolen token or a client + // holding a stale copy. Either way the safe move is to end the grant and make + // everyone re-authorize. + if (grant.refreshPrevHash === hash && grant.refreshHash !== hash) { + await revokeGrant(grant.id) + console.warn( + `[oauth] refresh token replay for client=${grant.client.clientId} user=${grant.userId}; grant revoked` + ) + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This refresh token has already been used.") + } + + if (grant.revokedAt) return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This authorization was revoked.") + if (grant.refreshExpiresAt && grant.refreshExpiresAt <= new Date()) { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This refresh token has expired.") + } + if (grant.user.status !== "ACTIVE") { + return oauthError("invalid_grant", "This account is not active.") + } + + const tokens = await issueAccessToken( + grant.id, + grant.userId, + grant.scopes, + grant.client.clientName + ) + + // Rotate. OAuth 2.1 requires it for public clients, and keeping the old hash + // in refreshPrevHash is what makes the replay check above possible. Done + // after the access token is minted so a failure there leaves the caller's + // existing refresh token still usable. + const next = generateRefreshToken() + await storeRefreshToken(grant.id, next.hash, hash) + + return NextResponse.json( + { ...tokens, refresh_token: next.token }, + { headers: NO_STORE } + ) +} diff --git a/src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/[id]/route.ts b/src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/[id]/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78f37b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/[id]/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { requireUser } from "@/lib/authz" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { revokeGrant } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * Disconnect an app. Cascades to every access token the grant issued, so the + * connection dies on the next request rather than at the end of the current + * access token's hour. + */ +export async function DELETE( + _request: Request, + { params }: { params: { id: string } } +) { + const session = await requireUser() + if (session instanceof NextResponse) return session + + // Scoped to the caller, 404 rather than 403 - the convention across the API. + const grant = await prisma.oAuthGrant.findFirst({ + where: { id: params.id, userId: session.user.id, revokedAt: null }, + select: { id: true }, + }) + if (!grant) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Not found" }, { status: 404 }) + + await revokeGrant(grant.id) + return NextResponse.json({ success: true }) +} diff --git a/src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/route.ts b/src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/route.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0496cd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/api/settings/mcp-grants/route.ts @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { requireUser } from "@/lib/authz" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" + +/** Apps the user has connected through OAuth, for the Settings list. */ +export async function GET() { + const session = await requireUser() + if (session instanceof NextResponse) return session + + const grants = await prisma.oAuthGrant.findMany({ + where: { userId: session.user.id, revokedAt: null }, + orderBy: { createdAt: "desc" }, + select: { + id: true, + scopes: true, + createdAt: true, + lastUsedAt: true, + client: { select: { clientName: true, clientUri: true } }, + }, + }) + + return NextResponse.json({ + grants: grants.map((g) => ({ + id: g.id, + clientName: g.client.clientName, + clientUri: g.client.clientUri, + scopes: g.scopes, + createdAt: g.createdAt, + lastUsedAt: g.lastUsedAt, + })), + }) +} diff --git a/src/app/oauth/authorize/page.tsx b/src/app/oauth/authorize/page.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82b6a19 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/app/oauth/authorize/page.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +import { redirect } from "next/navigation" +import { auth } from "@/lib/auth" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { Beer, ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react" +import { + Card, + CardContent, + CardDescription, + CardHeader, + CardTitle, +} from "@/components/ui/card" +import { ConsentForm } from "@/components/oauth/consent-form" +import { + buildRedirect, + validateAuthorizeRequest, +} from "@/lib/mcp/authorize-request" +import { + AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS, + SCOPE_DESCRIPTIONS, + coversScopes, + generateAuthCode, +} from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * The consent screen. + * + * Not in PUBLIC_ROUTES, so the middleware bounces an unauthenticated visitor to + * /login for us - and now that login honours ?callbackUrl they come straight + * back here afterwards. The explicit session check below is for the callbackUrl + * construction, not for access control. + * + * Deliberately outside the (app) route group: this is a credential prompt, and + * it should not be wrapped in the sidebar and bottom nav of the signed-in app. + */ +export const dynamic = "force-dynamic" + +type SearchParams = Record + +function toParams(searchParams: SearchParams): URLSearchParams { + const params = new URLSearchParams() + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(searchParams)) { + if (typeof value === "string") params.set(key, value) + else if (Array.isArray(value) && value[0]) params.set(key, value[0]) + } + return params +} + +export default async function AuthorizePage({ + searchParams, +}: { + searchParams: SearchParams +}) { + const search = toParams(searchParams) + const validation = await validateAuthorizeRequest(search) + + if (validation.kind === "fatal") { + return + } + + if (validation.kind === "redirectable") { + redirect( + buildRedirect(validation.redirectUri, { + error: validation.error, + error_description: validation.description, + state: validation.state, + }) + ) + } + + const { params, client } = validation + + const session = await auth() + if (!session?.user?.id) { + redirect(`/login?callbackUrl=${encodeURIComponent(`/oauth/authorize?${search}`)}`) + } + + // A session already implies an ACTIVE user - the jwt callback in lib/auth.ts + // returns null for anyone suspended or deleted, which clears the cookie. + const userId = session.user.id + + // Already approved for these scopes? Skip the screen. This is what makes a + // re-connection after an expired refresh token silent rather than another + // round of clicking Allow. + const existing = await prisma.oAuthGrant.findUnique({ + where: { clientId_userId: { clientId: client.id, userId } }, + select: { id: true, scopes: true, revokedAt: true }, + }) + + if (existing && !existing.revokedAt && coversScopes(existing.scopes, params.scopes)) { + const code = await createAuthCode(client.id, userId, params) + redirect(buildRedirect(params.redirectUri, { code, state: params.state })) + } + + return ( +
+ + +
+ +
+ + Connect {client.clientName} to DrinkTracker? + + + Signed in as {session.user.email ?? session.user.name} + + + +
+

It will be able to:

+
    + {params.scopes.map((scope) => ( +
  • + + {SCOPE_DESCRIPTIONS[scope] ?? scope} +
    • + ))} +
+
+ + {client.clientUri && ( +

+ {client.clientUri} +

+ )} + +

+ It will be sent back to {params.redirectUri}. + You can disconnect it any time from Settings. +

+ + + + +
+ ) +} + +async function createAuthCode( + clientRowId: string, + userId: string, + params: { + redirectUri: string + scopes: string[] + codeChallenge: string + resource: string | null + } +): Promise { + const { code, hash } = generateAuthCode() + await prisma.oAuthAuthCode.create({ + data: { + codeHash: hash, + clientId: clientRowId, + userId, + redirectUri: params.redirectUri, + resource: params.resource, + scopes: params.scopes, + codeChallenge: params.codeChallenge, + codeChallengeMethod: "S256", + expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS), + }, + }) + return code +} + +function ErrorCard({ title, detail }: { title: string; detail: string }) { + return ( +
+ + + {title} + {detail} + + +

+ Nothing was connected. Try starting the connection again from the app + you were using. +

+ + +
+ ) +} diff --git a/src/components/oauth/consent-form.tsx b/src/components/oauth/consent-form.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a768536 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/components/oauth/consent-form.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +"use client" + +import { useState } from "react" +import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button" +import { Loader2 } from "lucide-react" + +/** + * Approve or deny. + * + * The endpoint answers with JSON containing the URL to go to, and the browser + * navigates itself, rather than the POST replying with a 302 to claude.ai. The + * CSP sets `form-action 'self'`, and browsers have historically disagreed about + * whether that also constrains the redirect a form submission lands on. A + * client-side navigation sidesteps the question and gives somewhere to show an + * error if the request fails. + */ +export function ConsentForm({ search }: { search: string }) { + const [busy, setBusy] = useState<"allow" | "deny" | null>(null) + const [error, setError] = useState("") + + async function decide(decision: "allow" | "deny") { + setBusy(decision) + setError("") + try { + const res = await fetch("/api/oauth/authorize", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ decision, search }), + }) + const body = await res.json() + if (!res.ok || !body.redirectTo) { + setError(body.error_description ?? body.error ?? "Something went wrong.") + setBusy(null) + return + } + window.location.assign(body.redirectTo) + } catch { + setError("Could not reach the server. Please try again.") + setBusy(null) + } + } + + return ( +
+ {error && ( +
+ {error} +
+ )} +
+ + +
+
+ ) +} diff --git a/src/components/settings/mcp-tokens-card.tsx b/src/components/settings/mcp-tokens-card.tsx index 1469602..5ccd2ea 100644 --- a/src/components/settings/mcp-tokens-card.tsx +++ b/src/components/settings/mcp-tokens-card.tsx @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input" import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label" import { Badge } from "@/components/ui/badge" import { Select, SelectOption } from "@/components/ui/select" +import { Separator } from "@/components/ui/separator" import { Check, Copy, Loader2, Plug, Trash2 } from "lucide-react" interface McpToken { @@ -35,6 +36,15 @@ interface CreatedToken extends McpToken { secret: string } +interface McpGrant { + id: string + clientName: string + clientUri: string | null + scopes: string[] + createdAt: string + lastUsedAt: string | null +} + const ACCESS_OPTIONS = [ { value: "read", label: "Read only" }, { value: "read-write", label: "Read and write" }, @@ -103,6 +113,30 @@ export function McpTokensCard() { }, }) + // Apps connected through OAuth rather than a pasted token: claude.ai and + // ChatGPT arrive this way. + const { data: grantData } = useQuery<{ grants: McpGrant[] }>({ + queryKey: ["mcp-grants"], + queryFn: async () => { + const res = await fetch("/api/settings/mcp-grants") + if (!res.ok) throw new Error("Failed to load connected apps") + return res.json() + }, + }) + + const disconnect = useMutation({ + mutationFn: async (id: string) => { + const res = await fetch(`/api/settings/mcp-grants/${id}`, { + method: "DELETE", + }) + if (!res.ok) throw new Error("Failed to disconnect") + }, + onSuccess: () => { + queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ["mcp-grants"] }) + queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ["mcp-tokens"] }) + }, + }) + const serverUrl = data?.serverUrl ?? "" async function copy(key: string, value: string) { @@ -188,6 +222,52 @@ export function McpTokensCard() { )} + {!!grantData?.grants.length && ( +
+

Connected apps

+ {grantData.grants.map((grant) => ( +
+
+
+ {grant.clientName} + + {grant.scopes.some((s) => s.endsWith(":write")) + ? "read/write" + : "read only"} + +
+

+ Connected {new Date(grant.createdAt).toLocaleDateString()} + {grant.lastUsedAt + ? ` · last used ${new Date(grant.lastUsedAt).toLocaleDateString()}` + : ""} +

+
+ +
+ ))} + +
+ )} + +

+ Access tokens + + for clients you configure by hand, such as Claude Code + +

+
diff --git a/src/lib/auth.ts b/src/lib/auth.ts index 1d0d099..872e94f 100644 --- a/src/lib/auth.ts +++ b/src/lib/auth.ts @@ -16,6 +16,17 @@ const PUBLIC_ROUTES = [ "/invite", "/reset", "/share", + // OAuth discovery documents for the MCP server. These have to be readable + // without a session - an MCP client fetches them before it has any + // credential, and `authorized` would otherwise answer with an HTML redirect + // to /login, which the client cannot parse and reports as "couldn't reach + // the server". Being a prefix match, this makes any future /.well-known/* + // route public too, so put nothing there that isn't meant to be. + // + // Note /oauth/authorize is deliberately NOT here: the consent screen must + // sit behind the session, and the redirect to /login is exactly what should + // happen when a client sends an unauthenticated user to it. + "/.well-known", ] // Email and password only. Google and GitHub were configured but never had diff --git a/src/lib/mcp/authorize-request.ts b/src/lib/mcp/authorize-request.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16d4e80 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/mcp/authorize-request.ts @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { mcpResourceUrl } from "@/lib/mcp/config" +import { findMatchingRedirectUri, parseScopes } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth" + +/** + * Validation for an /oauth/authorize request, shared by the consent page and the + * approve endpoint so the two cannot drift. + * + * Order matters and is the whole point of the two-stage result below. Until the + * client and its redirect URI are known good there is nowhere safe to send an + * error, because an unvalidated redirect_uri is an open redirect. Only after + * both check out do errors become redirects, as RFC 6749 requires. + */ + +export interface AuthorizeParams { + clientId: string + redirectUri: string + state: string | null + scopes: string[] + codeChallenge: string + resource: string | null +} + +export interface ResolvedClient { + id: string + clientId: string + clientName: string + clientUri: string | null +} + +export type AuthorizeValidation = + /** Nothing may be redirected. Render this on our own page. */ + | { kind: "fatal"; message: string } + /** Client and redirect are trustworthy; report this back to the client. */ + | { + kind: "redirectable" + error: string + description: string + redirectUri: string + state: string | null + } + | { kind: "ok"; params: AuthorizeParams; client: ResolvedClient } + +export async function validateAuthorizeRequest( + search: URLSearchParams +): Promise { + const clientId = search.get("client_id") + const redirectUri = search.get("redirect_uri") + + if (!clientId) return { kind: "fatal", message: "Missing client_id." } + if (!redirectUri) return { kind: "fatal", message: "Missing redirect_uri." } + + const client = await prisma.oAuthClient.findUnique({ + where: { clientId }, + select: { + id: true, + clientId: true, + clientName: true, + clientUri: true, + redirectUris: true, + }, + }) + if (!client) return { kind: "fatal", message: "Unknown client_id." } + + // Port-agnostic for loopback, exact otherwise. Returns the registered form. + const matched = findMatchingRedirectUri(client.redirectUris, redirectUri) + if (!matched) { + return { + kind: "fatal", + message: "The redirect_uri does not match any registered for this client.", + } + } + + // From here on the redirect target is trusted, so problems go back to it. + const state = search.get("state") + const fail = (error: string, description: string): AuthorizeValidation => ({ + kind: "redirectable", + error, + description, + redirectUri, + state, + }) + + if (search.get("response_type") !== "code") { + return fail("unsupported_response_type", "Only response_type=code is supported.") + } + + const codeChallenge = search.get("code_challenge") + if (!codeChallenge) { + return fail("invalid_request", "PKCE is required: code_challenge is missing.") + } + const method = search.get("code_challenge_method") + if (method !== "S256") { + return fail( + "invalid_request", + "code_challenge_method must be S256; plain is not accepted." + ) + } + + // RFC 8707. If a client names an audience it must be this MCP server, or a + // token minted here could be replayed somewhere it was never meant for. + const resource = search.get("resource") + if (resource && resource.replace(/\/$/, "") !== mcpResourceUrl()) { + return fail( + "invalid_target", + `Unknown resource. This server issues tokens for ${mcpResourceUrl()}.` + ) + } + + return { + kind: "ok", + params: { + clientId, + redirectUri, + state, + scopes: parseScopes(search.get("scope")), + codeChallenge, + resource: resource ?? null, + }, + client: { + id: client.id, + clientId: client.clientId, + clientName: client.clientName, + clientUri: client.clientUri, + }, + } +} + +/** Builds the URL to send the user back to, preserving `state`. */ +export function buildRedirect( + redirectUri: string, + params: Record +): string { + const url = new URL(redirectUri) + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) { + if (value !== null) url.searchParams.set(key, value) + } + return url.toString() +} diff --git a/src/lib/mcp/oauth.ts b/src/lib/mcp/oauth.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99299be --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/mcp/oauth.ts @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto" +import { NextResponse } from "next/server" +import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" +import { generateMcpToken } from "@/lib/mcp/tokens" +import { MCP_SCOPES, type McpScope } from "@/lib/mcp/config" + +/** + * OAuth 2.1 authorization server primitives. + * + * This app is both the authorization server and the resource server, and it + * serves public clients only - no client secrets are stored anywhere, so there + * is nothing here to leak. Clients authenticate at the token endpoint with PKCE, + * which Claude always sends with S256. + */ + +/** Access tokens are short; the refresh token is what carries the session. */ +export const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000 +export const REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 90 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 +/** Long enough for a redirect and a token call, short enough to be useless if leaked. */ +export const AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000 + +export const OFFLINE_ACCESS = "offline_access" + +/** Advertised in discovery metadata and offered on the consent screen. */ +export const SUPPORTED_SCOPES: string[] = [...MCP_SCOPES, OFFLINE_ACCESS] + +export const SCOPE_DESCRIPTIONS: Record = { + "drinks:read": "See your drinks, ratings, wishlist and taste preferences", + "drinks:write": "Add, edit and delete drinks, ratings and wishlist entries", + "bar:read": "See your bar inventory and saved recipes", + "bar:write": "Add, edit and delete bar items and recipes", + [OFFLINE_ACCESS]: "Stay connected without asking you to sign in again", +} + +// ─── Opaque secrets ────────────────────────────────────────────── + +export function sha256(value: string): string { + return createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex") +} + +export function generateAuthCode(): { code: string; hash: string } { + const code = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url") + return { code, hash: sha256(code) } +} + +export function generateRefreshToken(): { token: string; hash: string } { + const token = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url") + return { token, hash: sha256(token) } +} + +export function generateClientId(): string { + return `dtc_${randomBytes(16).toString("hex")}` +} + +// ─── Scopes ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +/** + * Narrow a requested scope string to what this server actually grants. Unknown + * scopes are dropped rather than rejected: an unrecognised scope is not an error + * per RFC 6749, and rejecting would break clients that request extras. + */ +export function parseScopes(requested: string | null | undefined): string[] { + const asked = (requested ?? "").split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean) + const granted = asked.filter((s) => SUPPORTED_SCOPES.includes(s)) + // Default to read-only when nothing usable was asked for. + if (granted.filter((s) => s !== OFFLINE_ACCESS).length === 0) { + return ["drinks:read", "bar:read", ...granted.filter((s) => s === OFFLINE_ACCESS)] + } + return granted +} + +/** The scopes actually stored on an access token: everything except the marker. */ +export function accessScopes(scopes: string[]): McpScope[] { + return scopes.filter((s): s is McpScope => + (MCP_SCOPES as readonly string[]).includes(s) + ) +} + +export function coversScopes(granted: string[], requested: string[]): boolean { + return requested.every((s) => granted.includes(s)) +} + +// ─── PKCE ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +/** RFC 7636 unreserved set, 43-128 characters. */ +const VERIFIER_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9\-._~]{43,128}$/ + +export function verifyPkce(verifier: string, challenge: string): boolean { + if (!VERIFIER_RE.test(verifier)) return false + const computed = createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url") + const a = Buffer.from(computed) + const b = Buffer.from(challenge) + // Length check first: timingSafeEqual throws on a mismatch rather than + // returning false. + if (a.length !== b.length) return false + return timingSafeEqual(a, b) +} + +// ─── Redirect URIs ─────────────────────────────────────────────── + +function isLoopback(url: URL): boolean { + return ( + url.protocol === "http:" && + (url.hostname === "localhost" || + url.hostname === "127.0.0.1" || + url.hostname === "[::1]" || + url.hostname === "::1") + ) +} + +/** + * A redirect URI is acceptable at registration if it is https, or an RFC 8252 + * loopback address. Fragments are forbidden by RFC 6749. + */ +export function isRegisterableRedirectUri(value: string): boolean { + let url: URL + try { + url = new URL(value) + } catch { + return false + } + if (url.hash) return false + return url.protocol === "https:" || isLoopback(url) +} + +/** + * Matching a redirect at authorize time. + * + * Exact string equality, except for loopback addresses where the port is + * ignored. This is the single most common cause of a silently broken native + * client: Claude Code registers http://localhost/callback and + * http://127.0.0.1/callback, then redirects to an ephemeral port such as + * http://localhost:51234/callback. RFC 8252 section 7.3 requires the port to be + * ignored for the IP-literal form; the same is applied to localhost so Claude + * Code works at all. + */ +export function redirectUriMatches(registered: string, requested: string): boolean { + if (registered === requested) return true + + let a: URL, b: URL + try { + a = new URL(registered) + b = new URL(requested) + } catch { + return false + } + if (!isLoopback(a) || !isLoopback(b)) return false + return ( + a.protocol === b.protocol && + a.hostname === b.hostname && + a.pathname === b.pathname + ) +} + +export function findMatchingRedirectUri( + registered: string[], + requested: string +): string | null { + return registered.find((uri) => redirectUriMatches(uri, requested)) ?? null +} + +// ─── Errors ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +/** + * RFC 6749 error body. `invalid_grant` in particular is load-bearing: Claude + * keys off exactly that code to decide a refresh token is dead and it should + * restart the whole flow. Any other code leaves the connection stuck. + */ +export function oauthError( + error: string, + description?: string, + status = 400 +): NextResponse { + return NextResponse.json( + { error, ...(description ? { error_description: description } : {}) }, + { status, headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-store", Pragma: "no-cache" } } + ) +} + +// ─── Token issuance ────────────────────────────────────────────── + +export interface IssuedTokens { + access_token: string + token_type: "Bearer" + expires_in: number + scope: string + refresh_token?: string +} + +/** + * Mints an access token against a grant. + * + * Refresh tokens are deliberately NOT handled here. The two call sites need + * different behaviour - the code exchange creates the first one, a refresh + * rotates the existing one and has to record the previous hash for replay + * detection - and doing it in here once meant the rotation was silently + * overwritten and the token handed back matched nothing on file. + * + * The access token is an ordinary McpAccessToken row with source "oauth", the + * same shape a hand-minted one has, so verifyMcpToken needs no OAuth awareness. + * Previously outstanding tokens on the grant are revoked, so a refresh replaces + * rather than accumulates. + */ +export async function issueAccessToken( + grantId: string, + userId: string, + scopes: string[], + clientName: string +): Promise { + const access = generateMcpToken() + + await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => { + await tx.mcpAccessToken.updateMany({ + where: { grantId, revokedAt: null }, + data: { revokedAt: new Date() }, + }) + await tx.mcpAccessToken.create({ + data: { + userId, + tokenHash: access.hash, + prefix: access.prefix, + name: clientName, + scopes: accessScopes(scopes), + source: "oauth", + grantId, + expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS), + }, + }) + await tx.oAuthGrant.update({ + where: { id: grantId }, + data: { scopes, lastUsedAt: new Date() }, + }) + }) + + return { + access_token: access.raw, + token_type: "Bearer", + expires_in: Math.floor(ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS / 1000), + scope: scopes.join(" "), + } +} + +/** Stores a freshly minted refresh token on the grant, keeping the old hash for replay detection. */ +export async function storeRefreshToken( + grantId: string, + hash: string, + previousHash: string | null +): Promise { + await prisma.oAuthGrant.update({ + where: { id: grantId }, + data: { + refreshHash: hash, + refreshPrevHash: previousHash, + refreshExpiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_MS), + }, + }) +} + +/** Kills a grant and every access token it issued. */ +export async function revokeGrant(grantId: string): Promise { + const now = new Date() + await prisma.$transaction([ + prisma.mcpAccessToken.updateMany({ + where: { grantId, revokedAt: null }, + data: { revokedAt: now }, + }), + prisma.oAuthGrant.update({ + where: { id: grantId }, + data: { + revokedAt: now, + refreshHash: null, + refreshPrevHash: null, + }, + }), + ]) +}