Add MCP server so Claude and ChatGPT can read and write drink data

Exposes the collection over the Model Context Protocol at /api/mcp, with 22
tools covering drinks, ratings, bar inventory, recipes, wishlist and taste
preferences, plus search/fetch aliases for ChatGPT's deep-research mode.

Authentication is a bearer token, the app's first header-borne credential -
every other route derives identity from the NextAuth cookie, which a machine
client cannot present. /api/mcp sits under the middleware's /api exclusion so
it can answer a JSON 401 with an RFC 9728 WWW-Authenticate challenge instead
of an HTML redirect to /login.

Tokens are stored as a SHA-256 hash rather than plaintext like Invite.token
and PasswordReset.token. Those are single-use and short-lived; this one is
long-lived and grants read/write over a whole collection, and the nightly
pg_dump keeps 14 days of history. Not encrypt(), which is reversible AES and
right only for outbound keys we must replay; not bcrypt, which cannot be
indexed and would turn verification into a table scan per request.

verifyMcpToken joins User.status on every call, mirroring the jwt callback, so
suspending a member kills their MCP access immediately rather than leaving the
token as a documented way to outlive suspension. It fails closed on a database
error, deliberately unlike the jwt callback, which keeps the session because a
throw there would sign out every user at once.

No tool reaches the Switchboard gateway. Claude and ChatGPT are language
models already, so they can reason over a bar inventory without the app paying
to do it a second time, and a remote client looping a vision call is not a
failure mode worth having. Account deletion, restore, gateway keys, admin
routes and shared-list creation are excluded too.

The OAuth models ship now but are unused; the token endpoint will write the
same McpAccessToken rows, so adding it later touches no verification code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1Ee4Mc1X1SX8HgYa52zu7
This commit is contained in:
JP
2026-08-09 04:29:54 +00:00
parent 13793d43ca
commit 4fd339dabc
23 changed files with 2631 additions and 0 deletions

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import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
import { requireUser } from "@/lib/authz"
import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma"
/**
* Revoke a token. Soft, so the row survives for the audit trail; verifyMcpToken
* checks revokedAt on every request with no cache anywhere, so it takes effect
* on the next call.
*/
export async function DELETE(
_request: Request,
{ params }: { params: { id: string } }
) {
const session = await requireUser()
if (session instanceof NextResponse) return session
// Scoped to the caller, resolving to 404 rather than 403 - the convention
// across the rest of the API.
const { count } = await prisma.mcpAccessToken.updateMany({
where: { id: params.id, userId: session.user.id, revokedAt: null },
data: { revokedAt: new Date() },
})
if (count === 0) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Not found" }, { status: 404 })
}
return NextResponse.json({ success: true })
}

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import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
import { z } from "zod"
import { requireUser } from "@/lib/authz"
import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma"
import { generateMcpToken } from "@/lib/mcp/tokens"
import { MCP_ALL_SCOPES, MCP_READ_SCOPES, mcpResourceUrl } from "@/lib/mcp/config"
/**
* MCP access tokens.
*
* requireUser, not requireOwner: a token only ever reaches its own user's rows,
* so a member connecting their own Claude or ChatGPT is no more privileged than
* them logging into the web app.
*/
/** Enough to cover a laptop, a phone, a desktop client and some spares. */
const MAX_LIVE_TOKENS = 10
const createSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().min(1).max(100).optional(),
access: z.enum(["read", "read-write"]).default("read"),
expiresInDays: z.union([z.literal(90), z.literal(365), z.null()]).default(90),
})
export async function GET() {
const session = await requireUser()
if (session instanceof NextResponse) return session
const tokens = await prisma.mcpAccessToken.findMany({
where: { userId: session.user.id, source: "pat", revokedAt: null },
orderBy: { createdAt: "desc" },
// The secret is not selectable because it is not stored - only its hash is.
// This is the deliberate difference from /api/settings/api-keys, which
// decrypts and masks on read.
select: {
id: true,
name: true,
prefix: true,
scopes: true,
lastUsedAt: true,
expiresAt: true,
createdAt: true,
},
})
return NextResponse.json({
tokens,
serverUrl: mcpResourceUrl(),
})
}
export async function POST(request: Request) {
const session = await requireUser()
if (session instanceof NextResponse) return session
const body = await request.json().catch(() => null)
const parsed = createSchema.safeParse(body ?? {})
if (!parsed.success) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: "Invalid input", details: parsed.error.flatten() },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const live = await prisma.mcpAccessToken.count({
where: { userId: session.user.id, source: "pat", revokedAt: null },
})
if (live >= MAX_LIVE_TOKENS) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: `You already have ${MAX_LIVE_TOKENS} active tokens. Revoke one before creating another.`,
},
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const { name, access, expiresInDays } = parsed.data
const { raw, hash, prefix } = generateMcpToken()
const token = await prisma.mcpAccessToken.create({
data: {
userId: session.user.id,
tokenHash: hash,
prefix,
name: name ?? null,
scopes: access === "read-write" ? MCP_ALL_SCOPES : MCP_READ_SCOPES,
source: "pat",
expiresAt: expiresInDays
? new Date(Date.now() + expiresInDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
: null,
},
select: {
id: true,
name: true,
prefix: true,
scopes: true,
expiresAt: true,
createdAt: true,
},
})
// The only time the secret ever leaves this process.
return NextResponse.json(
{ token: { ...token, secret: raw }, serverUrl: mcpResourceUrl() },
{ status: 201 }
)
}