Add MCP server so Claude and ChatGPT can read and write drink data
Exposes the collection over the Model Context Protocol at /api/mcp, with 22 tools covering drinks, ratings, bar inventory, recipes, wishlist and taste preferences, plus search/fetch aliases for ChatGPT's deep-research mode. Authentication is a bearer token, the app's first header-borne credential - every other route derives identity from the NextAuth cookie, which a machine client cannot present. /api/mcp sits under the middleware's /api exclusion so it can answer a JSON 401 with an RFC 9728 WWW-Authenticate challenge instead of an HTML redirect to /login. Tokens are stored as a SHA-256 hash rather than plaintext like Invite.token and PasswordReset.token. Those are single-use and short-lived; this one is long-lived and grants read/write over a whole collection, and the nightly pg_dump keeps 14 days of history. Not encrypt(), which is reversible AES and right only for outbound keys we must replay; not bcrypt, which cannot be indexed and would turn verification into a table scan per request. verifyMcpToken joins User.status on every call, mirroring the jwt callback, so suspending a member kills their MCP access immediately rather than leaving the token as a documented way to outlive suspension. It fails closed on a database error, deliberately unlike the jwt callback, which keeps the session because a throw there would sign out every user at once. No tool reaches the Switchboard gateway. Claude and ChatGPT are language models already, so they can reason over a bar inventory without the app paying to do it a second time, and a remote client looping a vision call is not a failure mode worth having. Account deletion, restore, gateway keys, admin routes and shared-list creation are excluded too. The OAuth models ship now but are unused; the token endpoint will write the same McpAccessToken rows, so adding it later touches no verification code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1Ee4Mc1X1SX8HgYa52zu7
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JP
@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ model User {
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invitesCreated Invite[] @relation("InviteCreator")
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redemption InviteRedemption?
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passwordResets PasswordReset[]
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mcpTokens McpAccessToken[]
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mcpAuditLogs McpAuditLog[]
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oauthAuthCodes OAuthAuthCode[]
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oauthGrants OAuthGrant[]
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}
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// ─── Invites ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@@ -111,6 +116,143 @@ model PasswordReset {
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@@index([userId])
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}
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// ─── MCP access ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// The app's first header-borne credential. Every other route derives identity
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// from the NextAuth JWT cookie, which a machine client (claude.ai, ChatGPT,
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// Claude Code) cannot present.
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/// Bearer token for the MCP endpoint. Two producers, one table: a token minted
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/// by hand in Settings (source "pat") and one issued by the OAuth token endpoint
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/// (source "oauth") are the same row shape, so verification has a single path.
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///
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/// Stored as a SHA-256 hash, unlike Invite.token and PasswordReset.token which
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/// are plaintext. Those are single-use and short-lived; this one is long-lived
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/// and grants full read/write over a user's whole collection, and the nightly
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/// pg_dump keeps 14 days of history.
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model McpAccessToken {
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id String @id @default(cuid())
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userId String
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/// sha256 hex of the raw secret - never the secret itself
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tokenHash String @unique
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/// First 8 chars of the secret, so the UI can tell two tokens apart
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prefix String
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/// User-supplied label, or the OAuth client name
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name String?
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scopes String[]
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/// "pat" | "oauth"
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source String @default("pat")
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/// Set only for OAuth-issued tokens; revoking the grant revokes these with it
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grantId String?
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lastUsedAt DateTime?
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expiresAt DateTime?
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revokedAt DateTime?
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createdAt DateTime @default(now())
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user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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grant OAuthGrant? @relation(fields: [grantId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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@@index([userId])
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@@index([grantId])
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@@index([expiresAt])
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}
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/// One row per MCP tool call. Modelled on AiCall: the arguments are deliberately
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/// not recorded - they carry free-text tasting notes and could carry anything.
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model McpAuditLog {
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id String @id @default(cuid())
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userId String
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tokenId String?
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tool String
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ok Boolean
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errorCode String?
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/// Row the call created, updated or deleted
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recordId String?
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durationMs Int?
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createdAt DateTime @default(now())
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user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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@@index([userId, createdAt])
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@@index([createdAt])
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}
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/// A client registered through RFC 7591 dynamic registration. Not user-owned -
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/// registrations are global, and a user's access is revoked by cascading their
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/// OAuthGrant instead.
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model OAuthClient {
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id String @id @default(cuid())
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clientId String @unique
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clientName String
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redirectUris String[]
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grantTypes String[] @default(["authorization_code", "refresh_token"])
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responseTypes String[] @default(["code"])
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/// Public clients only - this server stores no client secrets
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tokenEndpointAuthMethod String @default("none")
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scope String?
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clientUri String?
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logoUri String?
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softwareId String?
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createdAt DateTime @default(now())
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lastUsedAt DateTime?
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authCodes OAuthAuthCode[]
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grants OAuthGrant[]
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@@index([createdAt])
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}
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/// Authorization code, hashed and single-use. Consumed with a guarded updateMany
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/// so a replayed code cannot mint a second token.
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model OAuthAuthCode {
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id String @id @default(cuid())
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codeHash String @unique
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clientId String
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userId String
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/// Exactly what was sent to /oauth/authorize - re-checked at the token endpoint
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redirectUri String
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/// RFC 8707 audience binding
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resource String?
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scopes String[]
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codeChallenge String
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codeChallengeMethod String @default("S256")
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expiresAt DateTime
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consumedAt DateTime?
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createdAt DateTime @default(now())
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client OAuthClient @relation(fields: [clientId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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@@index([userId])
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@@index([expiresAt])
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}
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/// A user's standing consent for one client. Holds the refresh token, since
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/// rotation replaces it while the grant itself persists.
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model OAuthGrant {
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id String @id @default(cuid())
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clientId String
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userId String
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scopes String[]
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refreshHash String? @unique
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/// One generation back. A hit here means a rotated token was replayed, which
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/// is a theft signal - revoke the whole grant rather than issuing again.
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refreshPrevHash String?
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refreshExpiresAt DateTime?
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revokedAt DateTime?
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lastUsedAt DateTime?
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createdAt DateTime @default(now())
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updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
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client OAuthClient @relation(fields: [clientId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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accessTokens McpAccessToken[]
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@@unique([clientId, userId])
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@@index([userId])
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}
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model Account {
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id String @id @default(cuid())
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userId String
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